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The question we address here is how industrial capital
became the dominant economic force in South Korea
in the post Second World War period. Industrial
development in South Korea (hereafter Korea) has
been carried out mostly by private capital,2 although
much of my argument concerns the ways in which the
state has influenced the form and pace of accumulation.
The essential premise is that the explanation of how
industrial capital becomes the driving force of society
lies at the very centre of any understanding of Third
World industrialisation. It raises two fundamental
questions. First, how is the social surplus product
generated - under what social relations (feudal,
capitalist, petty proprietorship) and using what
productive forces (land, labour, fixed capital,
technology)? Second, how is the social surplus
product, once produced, used? Is it consumed
luxuriously, remitted overseas, reinvested in industry,
trade or agriculture, or taxed by the state? The two
questions are intimately related.
The state appears as a prime mover at every stage of
class formation in Korea. There is no attempt here,
however, to develop a theory of the state, not only
because this would be very difficult, but also because I
am not convinced that it is valid to do so. Instead I
interpret the state in terms of the mode of
reproduction of society or the process of accumulation.
The policies of the state should be seen as both
reflecting and influencing the class structure. The
history of modern Korea tells us that the state is not
necessarily the instrument of a particular class
(although at times it has been), but it remains true that
I would like to acknowledge the valuable comments and criticisms
of Datd Evatis, Jon Hallidav. Richard Luedde-Neurath and
Gordon White.
2 In 1963 private enterprise produced 87 per cent of non-agricultural
GDP: the same figure applied in 1972. In the latter year it accounted
for 85 per cent of value-added in manufacturing and was
outweighed by public enterprtse only in electricity, water and
sanitatton. and finance. However, public enterprise absorbed about
30 per cent of total investment over the period 1962-73. All figures
are from Jones and SaKong [1980:148-50].
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at any time the state is thrown up in the process of class
struggle.
The Process of Primitive Capitalist
Accumulation
Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) had a profound effect
on the class structure of Korea, shaking it out of the
stagnation of the Yi dynasty. The political dominance
of the old ruling class - the monarchy, bureaucracy
and nobility - was swept away, and its economic
power was weakened as the Japanese acquired a large
proportion of cultivated land. Tenancy greatly
increased and agriculture - which provided Japan
with a large exportable surplus - became even more
firmly based on the landlord-tenant relationship.3
Although capitalist social relations were not intro-
duced into agriculture on a wide scale, production
became far more market-oriented, and the traditional
self-sufficiency and village insularity were destroyed
forever. There was, however, a remarkable growth of
capitalist industry during the 1920s and 1930s,
supplied by a glut of farmers-turned-proletarians
driven from the land by rural pauperisation. This
industry was overwhelmingly dominated by Japanese
capital, but a significant class of indigenous capitalists
did emerge, mainly in trade and small-scale industry.
Although capitalist social relations thoroughly
penetrated Korean society during the Japanese
period, the economy remained predominantly agri-
cultural and based on landlord-tenant relations. Pre-
capitalist forms continued to dominate immediately
after the war. The 1950s, however, saw a further
radical transformation of Korean society, one which
laid the foundatton of the industrial growth of the
1960s. This was a deepening of primitive accumulation
whereby capitalist social relations became the
dominant social form, politically and economically.
Although it was not until well into the I960s that the
Tltts is the brielest sumnlar\ of the much more detailed discussion in
chapter 2 of Hamilton [1983], from which the argument of this
paper ts extracted.
output of capitalist manufacturing and service
industries began to outweigh that of agricultural
peasant-proprietors, it was clear by the end of the
1950s that capitalism had taken hold as the irreversible
moving force in South Korean society.
This process of primitive accumulation separated
labour from the land and reconstituted it as an
industrial working class. lt simultaneously trans-
formed the physical and social basis of money-making
from agriculture to industry, converting rentier assets
into capital which multiplied through productive
investment.4 The importance of the process lay not in
the amassing of fortunes by individuals or firms, but in
the creation of conditions in which capital could be
accumulated through industrial production using
wage-labour. This transition came about in two broad
phases; the transformation of rentier assets into
commercial capital in the 1950s and the transformation
of commercial into industrial capital in the l960s.
This, of course, is a generalisation - in the l950s,
significant industrial growth took place - but we will
show it to be a reasonable one reflecting the broad
trends of accumulation in South Korea.
Phase I: the transformation of landed assets
into merchant capital in the 1950s
This came about in response to both repulsion from
the land and attraction to commerce. The former was
a result of the land reform, which was promulgated in
its final form in March 1950. It was based on the
principle of land-to-the-tiller and outlawed tenancy.
Along with land distributed by the US Army Military
Government (AMG) and land sold to tenants in
anticipation of land reform, the law within a couple of
years saw the redistribution of the great majority of
tenanted land in South Korea. The law set an upper
limit of about three hectares per household and
although there were some exemptions and cheating,
the reform did succeed in transferring the ownership
of the vast bulk of agricultural land to the cultivators.
Between 1945 and 1965 the proportion of farm
households which wholly owned their land rose from
14 to 70 per cent, and the proportion of pure tenants
fell from 49 per cent to 7 per cent [Ban et al 1980:286].
Consequently, agrarian social relations changed
profoundly and the rural power of the landlord class
was eliminated.
What precise effect did the land reform have on
landlords? First, it confirmed the decline in their
political and economic power. Land ownership had
already become less attractive because rents, tradi-
tionally very high, were more difficult to collect from
Since in post-war Korea agriculture was not based on capitalist
production relattons it is not strictly accurate to talk of 'agricultural
capital and 'rentier capital, thus the transformation of capital'.
The essential transformation is of the mode of production.
an increasingly truculent peasantry and had been
reduced by the state's grain collection policy. The
Land Reform Act decreed that former tenants were to
pay for their land 1.5 times the normal annual output
of the main crop. payable over five years to the
government. Landlords were to receive the equivalent
in government bonds (whose value was to be expressed
in terms of rice). However, since the government often
did not redeem the bonds on time and since most
landlords could not use them as collateral on business
loans, the market price of the bonds fell sharply.
Ban et al conclude that landlords received com-
pensation equivalent to around 15-25 per cent of their
former land assets [1980:290]. The difference accrued
partly to the former tenants and partly to the
government. Though many landlords went bankrupt
in the early 1950s [Pak and Gamble 1975:33], these
tended to be smaller owners who had not dissociated
themselves from the land in advance. More land was
sold privately by landlords to tenants in the 1945-5 1
period than was appropriated under the land reforms
[Ban et al 1980:286; also Pak and Gamble 1975:32]
and was disposed of on terms much more favourable
to the landlord. Moreover, the bonds of the dis-
possessed landlords were exchangeable for industrial
facilities formerly owned by the Japanese, and several
of today's large industrial concerns emerged in this
way. However, it was not always the landlords who
acquired the vested property this way for many bonds
were sold on the market to entrepreneurs, for prices
between 30 and 70 per cent of their face value. These
latter were often technical or managerial employees of
the same companies under the Japanese. The factories
were often sold at prices well below their actual worth
and financed by low-interest government loans,
frequently in return for political favours. Jones and
SaKong observe that the attempt at 'converting
landlords into capitalists is generally held to have been
a failure' [1980:35-61].
The evidence on the direct conversion of landlords
into merchants and industrialists is scarce. Jones and
SaKong's argument applies specifically to the scheme
of exchanging assets in land for assets in Japanese-
built factories through bonds. But this does not mean
that landlords could not find other paths into the
business world. If, despite the confiscatory element of
the land reform, many rich landlords were left still
wealthy after disposal of their land, they must have
found an alternative place to put their capital. In the
l950s, after the end of the war, opportunities for
profitable investment arose both in commerce,
particularly importing, and in import-substituting
industrial production. From the viewpoint of the
accumulation of capital the important point, however,
is not whether landlords were converted into
capitalists but that asset-holding and investment in
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land declined while commercial accumulation
accelerated. Even so, it is worth noting that the
wealthier landlords formed a disproportionate
number of the capitalists who financed the industrial
growth of the 1960s and 1970s. A survey of
manufacturing firms in 1976 found no less than 47 per
cent of entrepreneurs' fathers had been 'large-to-
medium landowners' [Jones and SaKong 1980:228].
The South Korean industrial economy suffered
extensive damage in the world war and again during
the civil war of 1950-53, and factories were slow to
return to capacity. Moreover, the north, now cut off,
had produced most of the peninsula's metallic and
chemical products and electric power. All this led to
severe shortages of manufactured (particularly
consumer) goods throughout the late 1940s and 1950s,
which provided lucrative opportunities, and sub-
sequently led to widespread charges of profiteering.
The basis for accumulation through trade lay in
foreign exchange allocation and US aid. No systematic
study has been made of this period and evidence is
almost wholly anecdotal [for some examples, see
Jones and SaKong 1980:272-3].
Kyong-Dong Kim has analysed the development of
the chaebol(family-based industrial conglomerates) in
the 1950s as a process of political favouritism allowing
windfall profits on commercial deals connected to
foreign aid [1976:468]. For instance, in 1952 the Rhee
administration illegally allocated three million dollars
of foreign exchange earned through tungsten exports
to 40 private firms. The funds were used to import
grains and fertilisers which, when sold at monopoly
prices and taking advantage of the discrepancy in
foreign exchange rates, earned enormous profits,
some of which flowed to Rhee's Liberal Party. Similar
gains were made by cement-producing firms which
also imported quantities of cement that were sold at
vastly inflated prices responding to high demand.
In markets where imported goods fetched very high
premiums, foreign exchange was a precious com-
modity. Since exports were relatively small, the source
of most foreign exchange was aid. According to Byun
and Kim 'it was a privilege to get a foreign exchange
allocation since import itself guaranteed profitable
opportunities because of the general shortage in every
kind of consumer good' [1978:10]. Preference in
allocation was given to exports (mainly of agricultural
and mineral products) and domestic producers
dependent on imports of capital goods. Loans for
these industries accounted for 45 per cent of total
imports in the 1945-61 period, and Byun and Kim
conclude that 'this access to loans rather than
production itself must have been the backbone of
profitable capital accumulation at that time' [1978:10].
Many traders were also able to take advantage of the
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multiple exchange rate system which, when combined
with an official exchange rate well below the market
rate, acted to subsidise the cost of imports from
government coffers [Byun and Kim 1978:11].
US aid was essential to this process. Dollars and
imported materials flowed to selected businesses, and
whether or not these resources were used to add value
domestically or were simply resold at a premium, the
mark-up could be prodigious. Access to productive
inputs which were limited by the shortage of foreign
exchange guaranteed some sort of monopoly over the
sale of goods produced with them. Not only could big
profits be made through access to dollars or imports
directly, but the flood of US army supplies after each
war permitted individuals with a little capital, political
influence or well-placed contacts to build fortunes.
This was augmented later by 'the hundreds of millions
of dollars' worth of surplus army material [which]
permitted some practitioners of "buy-and-sell" to
become established merchants' [Sung-Jae Koh in Park
et al 1980:373]. Later, when aid was allocated for
specific projects, collusion and political favouritism in
the bidding for government and US military contracts
was a further source of easy accumulation. This
method is said to have led to the emergence of the 'Five
Men' of the construction industry [Kim 1976:469].
The close relationship between the state and segments
of private capital was one of the most important
sources of accumulation.
Though the dominant trend during the period was the
emergence of capital in merchant form, we should also
recognise the considerable import-substituting growth
which occurred in the 1950s. The real gross fixed
capital stock grew at an average annual rate of 5.1 per
cent between 1953 and 1962 [Hong 1979:20-1, Table
2.6]. Moreover, although superprofits could be had
through access to foreign exchange and import
licences, the goods so obtained were often used in
productive activities which contributed to industrial
accumulation. At least 45 per cent of imports in the
1945-61 period went to domestic industrial concerns.
Even so, the dynamism of commerce in this period is
demonstrated by Byun and Kim in their study of the
'Fifty Groups', South Korea's 50 most powerful
industrial groups consisting of over 500 firms, nearly
60 per cent of which are in manufacturing [Byun and
Kim 1978]. Of the 50 groups, 31 were established in the
period under consideration, 1945-61(13 in 1945-52, 18
in 1953-61). Of these 31, no fewer than il began
business in foreign trade [Byun and Kim 1978]. It
might be objected that the official figures, so far as
they are accurate, show that wholesale and retail trade
in fact grew a little less fast than manufacturing in
1953-60 [Economic Statistics Yearbook 1967:10-1 1].
But a very large part of the trade being carried on in
South Korea at this time was not only immeasurable
but illegal, and probably outside official statistics.
There is no question, however, that a great deal of
import-substituting production began in the 1950s
and that this represented the growth of industrial
capital. The conditions for this were excellent. First of
all, there were a great number of factories built by the
Japanese which passed into Korean hands. Nor
should we ignore the significant development of
Korean-owned industry in colonial times, most of
which continued to operate and expand after the war
[Jones and SaKong 1980:28 give the detailsJ. Thirteen
of the future 50 groups pre-dated the world war [Byun
and Kim 1978:81. Through the stimulus of shortages
and abetted by government policy, import substitution
in the 1950s emphasised basic consumer industries
such as textiles, flour milling and sugar refining. From
1953 to 1961, mining and manufacturing grew at an
average annual rate of 12.2 per cent [Economic
Statistics Yearbook 1970:501. Although this new
production did replace potential imports, there was
still an increase in import dependence in many
manufacturing sectors during the 1950s, including
processed food, clothing, printing, and almost all
heavy, chemical and machinery sectors (but not
textiles, wood products and paper) [Suh 1975: Tables
5-1 and 5-2].
Nevertheless the government had taken certain
measures to encourage the development of domestic
manufacture. The multiple exchange rate helped and
so did high tariffs on both aid and non-aid financed
imports. The overvalued exchange rate was offset by a
system of tariffs whose rates rose in accordance with
the degree of competitiveness of the imports with
domestic production (but with very heavy rates levied
on luxury goods) and were low on necessary imports
of raw materials and capital goods. A system of tariff
exemptions helped channel imports at reduced cost to
selected domestic industries [Hong 1979:45-9; Suh
1975:198-9]. Undesired competition from imports was
further discouraged by quotas and tax exemptions,
and domestic industrial firms had access to bank loans
at cheap rates for expansion. These measures, which
aimed at expanding profits and hastening accumu-
lation in domestic enterprise, were the more effective
in that their impact was largely concentrated on the
bigger companies, the emerging chaebol.
By the end of the 1950s it was becoming clear that the
economic system that had overseen the decline of the
landed rentier and the rise of the capitalist could not be
sustained. The economy was a derivative one; industry
and agriculture were dependent on imports for
survival. The value of imports was at least 10 times
that of exports, and only US aid kept the economy
afloat [Hong 1979:46]. The significance of this had
been brought home through the cuts in aid in 1958-60
which were accompanied by falling growth rates. The
problem of the foreign exchange gap began to exercise
the minds of economists and politicians as it became
evident that US aid would not last very many years.
Social stability rested on imports and aid. But
although these factors suggest why a change in the
economic structure became necessary for future
development, it does not explain how that change
came about.
Phase II: the transformation of commercial
into industrial capital in the 1960s
The transition was launched by the student revolution
of 1960 which toppled the corrupt Rhee regime that
had so transformed society from its agricultural base.
The revolt might be seen as a product of the political
strains brought about by the inability of merchant
capital to provide for the needs of the people. As if to
confirm our argument about the dominance of
commercial capital in the 1950s and the methods by
which it was created, the anger of the populace was
directed mainly against profiteers, parasites, the
corrupt and the abusers of authority. The new military
government responded to popular demands for
retribution and passed a special law for dealing with
illicit wealth accumulation, designed to punish those
who 'accumulated wealth illicitly by taking advantage
of their positions of power'.
The latter was defined to cover those who had made
illicit profits from foreign exchange allocation,
contracts for public works and commodity supply,
cheap bank loans, tax avoidance and overseas transfer
of wealth. The Park government arrested most of
Korea's leading businessmen, and stood poised to
confiscate their assets. A deal was subsequently
struck, reflecting the changed economic emphasis of
the new administration, whereby criminal charges
would be dropped if the businessman agreed to build
factories and donate them to the state. According to
Jones and SaKong [1980:278], Park ushered in a new
phase in which the unproductive 'zero-sum activity' of
the l950s was largely replaced by 'positive-sum
activity'. The illicit wealth acccumulation episode
established a pattern 'whereby substantial assistance
was given to established businessmen who proved
themselves capable of initiating new manufacturing
and export activity'.5
Just as the transition from land rent to commercial
business came about under forces of repulsion and
One of the comments to emerge consistently in the interviews by
Jones and SaKong [1980: appendix A] with small and medium
businessmen is the belief that the t 950s were more corrupt, and that
in the 1960s government had become more efficient and more
impartial', less subject to favouritism and more supportive of
business.
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attraction, soit was in the transformation of merchant
into industrial capital. The repulsion of capital from
its old commercial circuit was due to the elimination of
the opportunities to make big profits simply through
trade and access to foreign exchange. In large measure
this was due to the fact that the military government,
unlike its predecessor, was not initially dependent on
donations from the wealthy, and by the time civilian
rule and elections came around industrial capital was
sufficiently well-organised to deliver strong support to
the Park government.
As the l960s progressed it became increasingly
difficult to multiply capital simply through access to
foreign exchange, aid funds and government favour.
These things continued to exist but the profits
attached to them were increasingly tied to productive
activity, the adding of value. The ability to import
through access to foreign exchange, which had been so
lucrative in the l950s, was made more and more
dependent on matching productive activity. The
export-import link system, introduced in 1962,
(discontinued in 1964 but reintroduced in 1966) gave
domestic manufacturers who could achieve export
success access to import licences for the most
restricted, and most rewarding, imported com-
modities.6 The impact was to encourage the growth
through exports of industries whose profit margins
would not otherwise have led to such expansion.
While the plethora of export promotion policies
introduced in the 1960s can be seen in this light, the
value of the export-import link system was that it
encouraged productive activity by making available
funds which would otherwise have filled the pockets of
merchants. This was not the only scheme to use the
scarcity of foreign exchange to provide incentives for
productive activity. The wastage allowance, which
permitted exporting firms to import intermediate
inputs over and above the technical requirements of
production, provided another source of profit tied to
expansion of value-added.
Given the import substitution of the l950s. it became
easier in the 1960s to limit severely imports of the
consumer goods which had been such bountiful profit-
makers for traders. The political climate made it
feasible to clamp down hard on the import of luxury
goods. This was achieved not only by simple
prohibition but also by the series of big devaluations
of the tt'on which followed the ousting of Rhee. By
making imports much more expensive they removed
much of the excess demand for imports which had
dominated the 1950s.
The export-Import link system had also operated between i95i and
1955. bui since exports were so small in that period and such exports
as there were tended to be primary products. it was not an effective
tnducement to tndustrtal expansion.
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In keeping with the nilitary-turned-civilian govern-
ment's productionist bias, everywhere bureaucratic
discretion, which has been a pillar of Korean
industrial development, has fayoured manufacturing
expansion over commercial activity. Industrial
promotion policies have been the mark of a
government that measures its success by growth
statistics. In the taxonomy of Jones and SaKong, only
one of the main zero-sum activities of the 1950s -
domestic and foreign credit - was not eliminated in
the transitional period [1980:273]. But even here
excess profits could be obtained by access to cheap
bank credit only on condition that the loan be used for
industrial expansion. The government had assumed
control of the commercial banks in the 'illicit fortunes'
confiscations of 1961, and this control over finance
was used to promote industrial growth by lengthening
the time-spans of loans so that industrial projects with
long gestation periods could secure finance. The
importance of bank lending in the economy was
enhanced by the interest rate reform of September
1965 which attracted a great flow of deposits into
banks and out of the short-term curb market.
The US role in all of this was crucial. From the mid-
1950s, US aid officials and US government policy had
been pressing hard for the more efficient and
productive allocation of aid funds. The US urged the
Rhee government to buildup the economic strength of
the country so that its development would be less
reliant on US aid. A large part of the explanation of
the withdrawal of US support for Rhee lay in his
unwillingness to embrace their view of Korea's
economic future. Certain changes also occurred in the
early 1960s which all but eliminated aid as a source of
commercial accumulation. First, the volume of aid
declined, both in absolute value and relative to
national income.7 Second, in the 1950s aid dollars had
been sold to selected importers at an official exchange
rate which was about half of the estimated parity rate
during 1953-61, and this was the source of windfall
profits Hong 1979:138]. The exchange rate reforms of
the early 1960s largely eliminated this gap. Third, a
growing proportion of US aid took the form of PL 480
surplus agricultural commodities (rising from an
average of 11 per cent in 1959-61 to 38 per cent in
1962-64). Consisting almost wholly of wheat and
cotton (especially after 1959), these flowed directly
into the flour-milling and textile industries [Hong
1979:137, Table 6.8]. Finally, as the diminishing
volume of aid was replaced by foreign loans and
Total aid (undeflated) averaged USS325mn per annum in 1956-58.
$222mn in 1959-61 and S199mn in 1962-64. and these represented
respectively around 14 per cent. 8 per cent and 6 per cent of Korean
GNP [Hong 1979:135].
The 1966 foreign capital inditcement law empowered the planning
minister to approse foreign capital inflows if they contributed to
export production or the development of key industries [Hong
1979:142].
investment, the government could itself carefully
regulate the inflow of finance.8
Conclusion
This study of the development of the classes of Korean
capitalism has a recurring theme: primitive accumu-
lation and the rise of industrial capital has been as
much a political process as an economic one. In the
re-ordering of agrarian social relations and the ruin of
the landlord, in the promotion and expansion of
commercial capital and then its change into industrial
form, in the provision of a vast supply of wage
workers, and in the protection of industrial capital
from the ravages of debt, the state has played a
fundamental role. At first land reform, distribution of
aid, allocation of import licences snd loans, then the
confiscation of illicit fortunes, curbing corruption,
tying profitability to productive activity through a
battery of policies, cracking down on speculative and
short-term capital, and sponsoring massive rural-
urban migration, each has been instrumental in
establishing the primacy of industrial accumulation.
This is not to claim that all of these measures were
deliberately taken to achieve this dominance, nor to
claim that the state was a neutral decision-maker
immune to the influence of the forces it was helping to
create. There is no question, however, that the
historical process which gave to the Korean state a
large degree of autonomy from particular class
interests was critical in the ascendancy of industrial
accumulation.
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